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Has the Old Testament anything to say to man today – man 
living in a world of revolutions, automation, nuclear weapons, 
with a materialistic philosophy that implicitly or explicitly 
denies religious values?1 
 
INTRODUCTION: A BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVE FOR BUSINESS ETHICS TEACHING? 
 
The Old Testament or Hebrew Bible is the religious foundation for Judaism 
but also for other religions, most notably Christianity and, in certain respects, 
Islam too. The paper builds on ethical economic research on the Old 
Testament and discusses, on this basis, how business ethics teaching can be 
enriched. This project therefore contributes to the ongoing “struggle”2 to 
ascertain ways of engaging economics with business ethics – in the present 
paper I do so specifically by merging economic research on the Old Testament 
with a social science perspective, i.e. institutional and constitutional 
economics. Using such a social science framework distinguishes the present 
paper from earlier research on Jewish business ethics, which largely examined 
the Decalogue and Talmud within a religious theological framework.3 The 
present paper lays out various principles of an institutional and constitutional 
economic approach to ethics and inquires whether, and if so how, such 
principles can be aligned with the Old Testament when economic / business 
activity is described in the Old Testament text. On this basis, principles for the 
teaching of business ethics have been derived. 
 The paper concentrates, albeit not exclusively, on the stories of Joseph 
and the stories of Solomon. In these stories, wealthy societies are depicted by 
the Old Testament. These societies resolved problems of economic 
organization within business activity: Economic cooperation materialized as 
the mutually advantageous exchange of capital, and this was successfully 
maintained not only within society, but also amongst nations. The paper 
                                               
1
 Erich Fromm, You Shall be as Gods. A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and its 
Tradition (London: Jonathan Cape, 1967), 3. 
2
 See Andrew Yuengert, “Economics and Interdisciplinary Exchange in Catholic Social 
Teaching and ‘Caritas in Veritate’“, Journal of Business Ethics 100 (2011), 42; similarly 
Moses L. Pava, “Religious Business Ethics and Political Liberalism: An Integrative 
Approach”, Journal of Business Ethics 17 (1998), 1633–1652; John Ruhe and Monle Lee, 
“Teaching Ethics in International Business Courses: The Impacts of Religions”, Journal of 
Teaching in International Business 19, no. 4 (2008), 366. 
3
 For example, Elliot N. Dorff, “Judaism, Business and Privacy”, Business Ethics Quarterly 7, 
no. 1 (1997), 31–44; Ronald M. Green, “Guiding Principles of Jewish Business Ethics”, 
Business Ethics Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1997), 21–30; Stewart W. Herman, “Enlarging the 
Conversation”, Business Ethics Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1997), 5-20; Meir Tamari, “The Challenge 
of Wealth: Jewish Business Ethics”, Business Ethics Quarterly 7, no. 1 (1997), 45–56; 
similarly, Abbas J. Ali and Manton Gibbs, “Foundation of Business Ethics in Contemporary 
Religious Thought: The Ten Commandment Perspective”, International Journal of Social 
Economics 25, no. 10 (1998), 1552–1564; Andrew Gustafson, “In Support of Ethical Holism: 
A Response to ‘Religious Perspectives in Business Ethics’”, Business Ethics Quarterly 10, no. 
2 (2000), 441–450. 
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critically investigates what lessons can be applied from such a reconstruction, 
conducted in economic ethical terms, to the contemporary practice of business 
ethics. The approach is therefore grounded in a scientific, economic tradition 
in the first place rather than explicitly behavioral religious or theological 
ones.4  
Accordingly, I have focused, in an institutional economic tradition, on 
key features of the market economy system and how the teaching of business 
ethics can inform about and intervene with such features. Disagreeing with 
Yuengert,5 the paper stresses that economics from Smith to Buchanan or 
Williamson here always has had a normative focus. In this connection, it will 
be especially interesting to see whether moral principles derived from the field 
of Old Testament based economics could only narrowly be recommended to 
students and managers who see themselves grounded, in a religious or ethical 
sense, in the Judeo-Christian tradition, or whether some wider practical 
recommendations for management can be established, possibly even in 
generic, universal ethical terms. The latter is called for by Ruhe and Lee with 
regard to religious business ethics in an international context.6 
The paper also analyzes concepts of economics such as the model of 
self-interested choice (homo economicus), and a dilemmatic model of 
cooperation conflict and destructive anarchy, and asks if conceptually 
identified within the Old Testament text, could it have subverted  the ethical 
stature of any business ethics debate which connects to Old Testament 
economics. 
 In the following, first, the paper asks how various conceptual 
principles of Old Testament economics can constructively advise the practice 
of business ethics. Second, supposedly “dismal” and possibly even “immoral” 
concepts of Old Testament economics, such as a model of self-interest and a 
dilemmatic, conflict-laden model of social interactions, are scrutinized 
regarding implications for the teaching of business ethics. A final part 
concludes the paper.  
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC OLD TESTAMENT RESEARCH FOR TEACHING 
BUSINESS ETHICS: PUBLIC GOOD AND WEALTH CREATION, THE ROLE OF THE 
LAW, ETHICAL CAPITAL CREATION, AND PLURALISM 
 
Principles of Old Testament economics can be projected to the teaching of 
business ethics. Such support of the teaching of business ethics can range from 
merely informative advice, which clarifies how Old Testament economics 
ascertains the ethical nature of managerial practice, to active, interventionist 
                                               
4
 Regarding the latter, see Gustafson “Ethical Holism”, and the other sources quoted above. 
5
 Yuengert, “Economics and Catholic Social Teaching”, 52. 
6
 Ruhe and Lee, “International Business Courses”, 368. 
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advice, which proposes strategies for management in order to strengthen the 
business ethics stance of a company.  
In the following, I discuss four fundamental points that have 
implications for the teaching of business ethics, first, in terms of how ethical 
outcomes of governing a society in a capitalist tradition, i.e. regarding  the goal 
of public good, can be aligned with the Old Testament text; second, in terms 
of principles on constitutional and institutional-legal governance as described 
in the Old Testament text; third, in terms of ideas on ethical capital creation 
that can be derived from the Old Testament text; finally, in terms of notions of 
pluralism that can be identified for the Old Testament text. All four lines of 
inquiry imply that economics and an economic approach to business ethics is 
not as “value-neutral” or even “value-skeptical” as critics of an economic 
approach to business ethics seem to imply.7 
 
 
OLD TESTAMENT ECONOMICS AND THE NORMATIVE GOALS OF PUBLIC  
GOOD, SOCIETAL WEALTH AND MUTUAL GAINS 
 
The normative goal of the institutional economic governance of a society in a 
capitalist tradition is, if put in a political macro-perspective, the creation of 
wealth, of public “good”. Smith and Mandeville were equally outspoken and 
very clear on this normative stance of economics, and this position has been 
picked up very consistently by contemporary constitutional and institutional 
economics too (e.g. in the works of Buchanan, North, or Williamson; 
Friedman, too).8  
From the early roots of business organization theory, for instance in 
Taylor’s writings,9 this normative focus on creating shared wealth – then, 
among organization members – has also been equally clear.10 Here, at the 
                                               
7
 For example, Yuengert, “Economics and Catholic Social Teaching”, 42. 
8
 James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty. Between Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1975); James M. Buchanan, “The Constitution of Economic 
Policy”, American Economic Review 77 (1987), 243–250; Douglas C. North, “Institutions”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (1991), 97-112; Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and 
Hierarchies. Analysis and Anti-trust Implications (The Free Press: New York, 1975); Oliver 
E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1985); 
Oliver E. Williamson, “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead”, 
Journal of Economic Literature 38 (2000), 595–613; Oliver E. Williamson, “Transaction Cost 
Economics: The Natural Progression”, American Economic Review 100 (2010), 673–90; also 
Milton Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits”, New York 
Times Magazine (September 13, 1970), 32–33, 122–126. 
9
 See Frederick W. Taylor, Shop Management, reprinted in Scientific Management, ed. F. W. 
Taylor (London: Harper & Row, 1903/1964); Frederick W. Taylor, The Principles of 
Scientific Management, reprinted in Scientific Management, ed. F. W. Taylor (London: Harper 
& Row, 1911/1964). 
10
 See Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, Human Nature and Organization Theory: On the 
Economic Approach to Institutional Organization (Cheltenham, New York: Edward Elgar, 
2003; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “An Institutional Economic Reconstruction of 
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micro-level of the firm, the macro-goal of societal wealth is contributed to in 
different respects: Profit-generating management is to yield mutual gains in 
economic interactions on the one hand, and it unintentionally contributes to 
generating public good in macro-perspective on the other (through creating 
employment, tax payments to governments, innovating new products, etc.). 
This normative position on public good and mutual gains ethically 
legitimizes the market economy: It reflects that economic activity is to yield 
“public good” and wealth creation in society. In the classical understanding of 
Smith, this normative approach of economics is predominantly conceptualized 
as a matter of unintentional outcomes stemming from merely self-interested 
choice by business; for instance, “even” merely profit-oriented management is 
to produce rising living standards over time. This ethical stance of economics 
is underestimated or overlooked by some commentators on business ethics, 
religion and corporate social responsibility.11 Here, the unintentional outcome 
of rising public good in the Smithsonian program, and the ethical quality of 
this unintended outcome, seems to be questioned by the kind of “moral 
economics” that, for example, Kohls and Christensen, or Etzioni advocate.12 
 Before I delve deeper into the particular implications for business 
ethics teaching of this normative outlook of economics, I want to trace such a 
normative, ethical perspective of economics in the Old Testament text. Can we 
find ideas on mutual gains, public good, and wealth creation in the Old 
Testament? There are basically two avenues for developing this project: One 
approach is to look at stories where cooperation (again, understood as 
mutually advantageous economic exchange of capital) among different parties 
succeeded and then we examine reasons for and outcomes of this process, 
especially with regard to whether and why public good and wealth creation 
was realized in societal perspective. The other route focuses on contrary-
examples which depict the break-down of cooperation, and then we ask 
whether and why societal mutual loss resulted in capital exchange processes, 
and subsequently also wealth and public good suffered in the wake of derailed 
economic cooperation. 
 Key examples in the Old Testament, where cooperation (understood as 
economic exchange) succeeded in a society and even among societies, are the 
stories of Joseph and the stories of Solomon. In the Joseph stories, Joseph the 
Israelite, started out as a slave to Egypt, but then quickly ascended, because of 
                                                                                                                           
Scientific Management: On the Lost Theoretical Logic of Taylorism”, Academy of 
Management Review 32 (2007), 105–117; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Scientific 
Management Revisited: Did Taylorism Fail Because of a Too Positive Image of Human 
Nature?”, Journal of Management History 14 (2008), 348–372. 
11
 For example, Bala Ramasamy, Matthew C. Yeung, and Alan K. Au, “Consumer Support for 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR): The Role of Religion and Values”, Journal of 
Business Ethics 91 (2010), 61. 
12
 See John Kohls and Sandra L. Christensen, “The Business Responsibility for Wealth 
Distribution in a Globalized Political-Economy: Merging Moral Economics and Catholic 
Social Teaching”, Journal of Business Ethics 35 (2002), 225–227; Amitai Etzioni, The Moral 
Dimension. Towards a New Economics (New York: Free Press, 1988). 
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his skills for economic governance, to the top of Egypt’s industrial hierarchies, 
ultimately becoming answerable only to the pharaoh. A prospering society is 
depicted in Genesis, with Joseph as political leader of Egypt’s industrial 
hierarchies, who created a constitutional-institutional framework of free 
market exchanges, governed by bureaucratic hierarchies (as explained in more 
detail below regarding Joseph’s tax policy and land reform). This enabled 
individual “entrepreneurial” members of this society to engage in economic 
activity that contributed – albeit unintended by individual members – to larger 
societal welfare.13  
Once the Israelites relocated in the closing chapters of Genesis to 
Egypt, they shared in economic wealth creation in the Egyptian society. Jacob, 
the patriarch of Israel, confirmed this and praised Joseph as the “fruitful vine 
of Israel”.14 Undeniably, economic cooperation was institutionally established 
for this society, even in international perspective, with Egypt’s neighboring 
countries benefitting from Joseph’s policies too. Public good was realized, 
Egypt being an affluent society, the proverbial land where “milk and honey 
flowed.” 
A similar outcome of public good being created in a blossoming 
society can be observed for the Solomon stories. As in the Joseph stories, 
Solomon institutionally governed his society through tall bureaucratic 
hierarchies. Governed in this way, entrepreneurial economic activity at the 
level of individual craftsmen and farmers was stimulated. Israel turned into a 
place where wealth for all was realized: “The king made silver as common in 
Jerusalem as stones.”15 And: “The people of Judah and Israel were as 
numerous as the sand on the seashore; they ate, they drank, and they were 
happy”.16 Even critical interpreters of the Solomon stories concede in this 
respect that prosperity increased for all, rather than just for an elite few.17  
 This short review of the generation of public good in the Joseph stories 
and Solomon stories has to suffice at this point.18 Counter-examples of stories, 
                                               
13
 See Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, Is God an Economist? An Institutional Economic 
Reconstruction of the Old Testament (Basingstoke, UK, New York et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2009; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Out of a Slave Contract: The Analysis of Pre-
Hobbesian Anarchists in the Old Testament”, Constitutional Political Economy 21 (2010), 
288–307; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “The Genesis of Cooperation in the Stories of 
Joseph: A Constitutional and Institutional Economic Reconstruction”, Scandinavian Journal 
of the Old Testament, forthcoming. 
14
 Genesis 49: 22. 
15
 1 Kings 10: 27. 
16
 1 Kings 4: 21–22. 
17
 See David Jobling, “‘Forced Labour’: Solomon’s Golden Age and the Question of Literary 
Representation”, Semeia 54 (1992), 57–76. 
18
  For details, see Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “An Economic Reading of the Exodus: 
On the Institutional Economic Reconstruction of Biblical Cooperation Failures”, 
Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament 22, no. 1 (2008), 114–34; Wagner-Tsukamoto, 
“God the Economist”; Wagner-Tsukamoto “Slave Contract”; Sigmund A. Wagner-
Tsukamoto, “State Formation in the Old Testament”, Journal for the Study of the Old 
Testament, 37, no. 4 (2013), 391-422. 
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in which economic cooperation derailed and as a result public good suffered, 
provide complementary readings, e.g. the paradise story, some of the Jacob-
Laban stories, or the exodus stories.19 
It is apparent that conceptually, once reconstructed through 
institutional and constitutional economics regarding the goal of public good, 
these Old Testament stories mirror outcomes of the market economy system – 
outcomes as we associate them with Smithsonian economics and equally with 
contemporary institutional and constitutional economics. What are the 
implications for the teaching of business ethics? Clearly, these stories offer in 
terms of the goal of public good and how institutional governance contributes 
to it (as reviewed in more detail below) many implications for political ethical 
governance. However, recommendations for political consultancy are not the 
purpose and the topic of the present paper. Rather, I placed the focus on 
implications at the managerial level of the firm: How does the identification 
of public good goals of the market economy system “even” for an age-old text 
like the Old Testament support the teaching of business ethics?  
With regard to the goal of public good, this is contributed to by firms 
in a market economy in a largely indirect, unintentional way: “Even” profit-
generating management in the market economy system already reflects 
business ethics20 – since if contributes to fostering the “wealth of nations”, 
                                               
19
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto “Economic Reading of the Exodus”; Wagner-Tsukamoto “God the 
Economist”; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “The Paradise Story: A Constitutional 
Economic Reconstruction”, Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 34, no. 2 (2009), 147–
170; Wagner-Tsukamoto “Slave Contract”; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “The Tree of 
Life: Banned or Not Banned? A Rational Choice Interpretation”, Scandinavian Journal of the 
Old Testament 26, no. 1 (2012), 102–122; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “After the Theft: 
Natural Distribution States and Prisoner’s Dilemmas in the Paradise Story”, Old Testament 
Essays 25, no. 3 (2012), 705-736; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Homo Economicus and 
the Stories of Jacob: On the Methodological Relevance of Rational Choice Theory for 
Studying the Hebrew Bible”, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 25, no. 1 (2013), 78-
100; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, The Economics of Paradise. On the Onset of Modernity 
in Antiquity (Basingstoke, UK, New York et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), forthcoming. 
20
 See Michael Novak, Business as a Calling (New York: Free Press, 1996); Sigmund A. 
Wagner-Tsukamoto, “An Economic Approach to Business Ethics: Moral Agency of the Firm 
and the Enabling and Constraining Effects of Economic Institutions and Interactions in 
Market Economy”, Journal of Business Ethics 60 (2005), 75–89; Sigmund A. Wagner-
Tsukamoto, “Moral Agency, Profits and the Firm: Economic Revisions to the Friedman 
Theorem”, Journal of Business Ethics 70 (2007), 209–220; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, 
“Contrasting the Behavioural Business Ethics Approach and the Institutional Economic 
Approach to Business Ethics: Insights from the Study of Quaker Employers”, Journal of 
Business Ethics 82 (2008), 835–850; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Questioning the 
Weber Thesis: Capitalist Ethics and the Hebrew Bible?”, Sociology Mind 2, no. 1 (2012), 1–
11; Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Updating Adam Smith on Business Ethics: Institutional 
Economics and Ethical Capitalism”, Conference Paper, 4th World Business Ethics Forum 
(Hong Kong: Hong Kong Baptist University, December 16-18, 2012); Sigmund A. Wagner-
Tsukamoto, “Economic Humanism and Western Management: Theory and Practice”, in 
World Humanism. Cross-cultural Perspectives on Ethical Practices in Organizations, eds. 
Shiban Khan and Wolfgang Amann (Basingstoke, UK, New York et al.: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 15-29. 
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rising living standards over time, employment, etc. This is one of the classical 
viewpoints that were implied by Smith regarding “business ethics”, and 
contemporary economists explicitly restated this, very outspokenly so in the 
case of Friedman or Buchanan.21 One important task of business ethics 
teaching is in this respect to inform about the unintended societal welfare 
outcomes of profit-making. This fundamentally, but not exclusively, 
legitimizes the market economy system, and with it, managerial and corporate 
activity at the micro-level of the market economy. 
 
 
OLD TESTAMENT ECONOMICS AND TEACHING BUSINESS ETHICS: 
INSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE AND RULE-FOLLOWING 
 
Institutional governance can impose ethical principles on a firm from the 
outside and from within. Externally, this is achieved through the political 
framework of constitutional and institutional-legal ordering that frames a 
market economy system. Smith was already very clear in this respect, in 
Books IV and V of the Wealth of Nations, stating that strong constraints 
needed to be institutionally provided to influence business activity and prevent 
potential undesirable outcomes as a result of unrestrained economic activity.22 
Such constraints relate to customer protection, employee protection, the 
safeguarding of investor interests, the defending of governmental concerns, 
etc. Business ethics behavior of the firm in this respect usually manifests as 
law-abiding behavior. 
 The Old Testament text, when approached in this way from an 
institutional economic perspective, reveals ethical principles on constitutional 
and institutional-legal governance for business activity. Again, I regard the 
Joseph stories and the Solomon stories as the key examples.23 In both the 
Joseph stories and the Solomon stories, tax laws constrained business activity 
and contributed, through making the entrepreneur pay taxes, to public good. In 
the Joseph stories we find the barter tax system: a twenty percent tax that was 
levied on crop production.24 The release of crop back into the economy in 
times of downturn had positive economic effects, lowering transaction costs 
                                               
21
 See Friedman, “Social Responsibility”, Buchanan, Limits of Liberty. 
22
 See Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, 2 Vols., 
ed. by Roy H. Campbell, Andrew S. Skinner and William B. Todd (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976); David A. Reisman, “Adam Smith on Market and State”, Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 154 (1998), 357–384; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Moral Agency of the 
Firm”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Friedman Theorem”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Updating Adam 
Smith on Business Ethics”. 
23
 The Decalogue and its legal derivatives provide further, rich sources; see, for example, 
Tamari, “Challenge of Wealth”, 46–49, 52–53; or Green, “Principles of Jewish Business 
Ethics”, 23–27, on Jewish Talmudic and halakhic teaching that constrain economic behavior. 
24
 Genesis 41: 34, 47: 24, 26. 
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and attack/defense costs for this society in various respects.25 A similar effect 
can be observed in the Solomon stories where the various districts of 
Solomon’s state provided, in turn, monthly tributary payments to the state 
court, funding this court and the various institutional functions it executed. 
This again contributed to public good by lowering transaction costs and 
attack/defense costs for this state.26 
 The key counter-examples are the exodus stories. They illustrate 
institutionally economic, disastrous rule-making and rule change.27 In 
particular there were two rule changes at the beginning of these stories which 
escalated conflicting interactions between Egypt and Israel: changes to 
population management policies, i.e. the pharaoh’s genocidal order to kill all 
first-born sons of Israel, and rule changes to industrial management policies, 
i.e. the lengthening of working hours for the Israelite workforce and the new 
request to the Israelite work force to provide, on their own account, certain 
production inputs (straw for brick production). In addition to the pharaoh, 
Moses and the God of Exodus also exhibited considerably less cooperative 
behavior than the agents in the Joseph stories. The stories of Rehoboam, which 
follow the Solomon stories, tell a comparable line of societal disastrous rule 
change regarding taxation.  
 So, what are the implications for the teaching of business ethics once 
such institutional economic constraints have been identified in the Joseph 
stories and the Solomon stories? In this respect, Old Testament economics 
serves as an example of the ethical nature of law-abiding behavior. The 
examples of the Old Testament are simple and straightforward: Through 
conforming to tax laws, business activity contributes, through institutional 
economic mechanisms, to larger, societal welfare goals. Unlike the ethical 
quality of profit-making which arises as an incidental side effect (as reviewed 
above), paying taxes does not happen unintentionally; taxes are not paid 
without knowledge, accidently, or randomly. Here, business ethics teaching 
needs to outline the ethical quality of law-abiding behavior: Information needs 
to be provided regarding how and in what respects modern laws contribute to 
societal welfare goals through codifying ethics. Approached in this way, laws 
are perceived as constraining business activity and inducing, through their 
sanctions, law-abiding behavior of firms. This is not a small or detrimental 
agenda for business ethics teaching.28 
 In addition to externally imposed rule-following, rules can be 
internally self-imposed by the firm. With regard to their internal rules and 
                                               
25
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, God the Economist; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Slave Contract”; 
Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Genesis of Cooperation”. 
26
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “State Formation”. 
27
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Economic Reading of the Exodus”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, God the 
Economist. 
28
 See Novak, Business as a Calling, 141; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Friedman Theorem”, 211–
213. 
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organization structures, firms are quite free to invent and create them.29 The 
economic purpose of internal governance is to ensure wealth creation at the 
micro-level of the individual firm: Through incentivizing behavior, 
institutional structures are to “bind” all organization members, including the 
top management, to engage in organizationally rational but not merely 
individually rational or even opportunistic behaviour. Mutual gains are to be 
realized among all organization members, the realization of which also 
contributes to overall corporate goals. Taylor outlined this early on,30 and 
contemporary constitutional and institutional economics have continuously 
reinforced this theme.31 
 The realization of mutual gains at the micro-level of exchange 
interactions, and the organization structures which institutionally channel such 
interactions, reflect on concepts of fairness and therefore already possess 
ethical qualities. Business ethics teaching needs to inform and educate about 
these qualities. It needs to stress that institutional economic governance that 
ensures mutual gains in the firm also develops ethical qualities. Furthermore, 
and this relates to the point from the previous section, the realization of mutual 
gains and profit at the level of the firm subsequently contributes to larger 
societal welfare goals, although this occurs completely as an unplanned side 
effect of the firm’s operation. 
 
 
OLD TESTAMENT ECONOMICS AND TEACHING  
BUSINESS ETHICS: ETHICAL CAPITAL CREATION 
 
In the conventional understanding of classical or neo-classical economics, 
from Smith to Friedman, the market process as such was originally conceived 
as “moral-free”.32 Ethics was merely linked to the market economy system (a) 
in relation to the goal of public good, which was realized unintentionally by 
the individual participants of that system, and (b) in relation to law-abiding 
behavior, which in conventional economic understanding reflects the proper 
place of morality in a market economy system. 
However, with the onset of green consumer behavior and ethical 
investor behavior in many modern market economies (at least from the 1980s 
onwards), market processes generally have increasingly become moralized 
too, at least so in niche markets. For example, in many supermarket, organic, 
                                               
29
 See Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies; Williamson, Economic Institutions. 
30
 See Taylor, Shop Management; Taylor, Principles of Scientific Management. 
31
 For example, Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies; Williamson, Economic Institutions; 
Williamson, “New Institutional Economics”; Williamson, “Transaction Cost Economics”; see 
also Buchanan, Limits of Liberty; Buchanan, “Constitution of Economic Policy”; Gordon 
Tullock, “Adam Smith and the Prisoners’ Dilemma”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 100 
(1985), 1073–1081; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Human Nature”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Lost 
Theoretical Logic of Taylorism”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Scientific Management Revisited”. 
32
 This is correctly assessed by Gustafson, “Ethical Holism”, 443. 
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free-range, fair trade or otherwise “green” choice options have become a 
common phenomenon. Conceptually, we can approach this as “ethical capital 
creation” inside the market economy system, with respect to the 
manufacturing of products according to environmental standards, fair trade 
standards, or animal rights standards that surpass legal requirements. In this 
understanding, ethical capital yields profitable market opportunities for the 
firm; such opportunities are rather actively created by the firm: by producing 
green products to standards beyond the legally required, and catering for 
ethically aware green stakeholders (such as green consumers or green 
investors) who are prepared to pay potential price premiums for green 
products. Ethical capital exchange then resides insides these market 
opportunities for green products, where profits are created for the firm 
“despite”, but better: “because of” a firm surpassing legal requirements.33 
Such special ethical features of products or services can be marketed to 
consumers (or other stakeholders of the firm if involved) and ethics can in this 
respect rather actively enter the market process, being priced in relation to a 
product or service that surpasses legal requirements. In this regard, I can 
partially agree with Kohls and Christensen34 that fair trade products deserve 
promotion but in contrast to them I would instrumentally, economically 
ground this argument for the firm, as a matter of capital creation.  
Ethical capital creation cannot be pursued independent of profitability 
reasons; although, ethical capital creation can be strengthened and driven more 
vigorously into the firm by ethical or religious convictions of managers. The 
latter could be viewed as a supportive though not as an essential requirement 
for stimulating ethical capital creation. If pursued with divinity in mind, 
ethical capital creation opens up a distinctively economic route to intentional 
religious stewardship of the firm that concerns property.35 This approach 
offers a different conceptual route to the one outlined by Pava, who suggested 
to bring private religious ideals into business ethics programs by questioning 
the private versus public nature of firms.36 In the route to ethical capital 
                                               
33
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Moral Agency of the Firm”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Friedman 
Theorem”; see also Sigmund A. Wagner, Understanding Green Consumer Behaviour 
(London: Routledge, 1997). 
34
 See Kohls and Christensen, “Wealth Distribution”, 232–233. 
35
 Regarding this understanding of “property”, see Thomas F. McMahon, “The Contributions 
of Religious Traditions to Business Ethics”, Journal of Business Ethics 4 (1985), 344–345; 
Gerard Magill, “Theology in Business Ethics: Appealing to the Religious Imagination”, 
Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992), 133. 
36
 See Pava, “Religious Business Ethics”. From an institutional and constitutional economic 
point of view, following the research traditions of Buchanan and Williamson, I question 
Pava’s, (pp. 1637–1640) three lines of inquiry on monopolies, externalities, and lobbying, as 
to why firms should be conceptualized as quasi-public institutions rather than private 
institutions. Hence, I would not subscribe to Pava’s further analysis regarding why and how 
religious ethics could or could not be reconciled with the governance of firms (which is 
grounded in Pava’s concept of the firm as the “quasi-public” institution). 
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creation I outlined, firms remains strictly “private” entities but are not turned 
into “public” ones the way Pava interprets this. 
Specifically, ethical capital creation, as advocated in the present paper, 
ensures from the outset that the profitability and competitiveness of the firm – 
understood as a “private” enterprise – are maintained, which Pava discussed as 
sources that prevent religion from entering business ethics activity.37 Highly 
religious Quaker firms, at the beginning of the 20th century, confirm this 
suspicion of Pava.38 However, the concept of ethical capital creation bypasses 
problems of exclusively religious behavioral business ethics regarding the 
maintaining of profitability and competitiveness of the firm in a market 
economy since ethical capital creation (and the kind of economic cooperation 
as exchange of capital it instigates between firm and stakeholders), 
conceptually and practically is in tune with the market economy from the 
outset. 
These insights regarding ethical capital creation have implications for 
the teaching of business ethics, since the moralization of behavior in a 
religious behavioral or ethical behavioral sense at the personal, individual 
level of business students or managers is not necessarily directly intervened 
with, although this may support inclinations of managers to consider ethical 
capital creation (as noted above). Some of Gustafson’s suggestions on how to 
reconcile personal ethics, personal world views and the business ethics 
position of an organization can be approached in this manner.39 
However, as has been emphasized, the economic approach to teaching 
business ethics outlined in the present paper is different to moral or religious 
behavioral pedagogy whose exclusive aim is targeting and educating personal 
character and deepening individual ethical or religious values.40 The need for 
such a different, economic approach to the teaching of business ethics, which 
is not necessarily grounded in theology, may be even more pressing since 
prior research has found that business ethics courses that directly aimed to 
deepen moral or religious character attitudes at the personal, private level of 
the individual were comparatively ineffective.41 
                                               
37
 See Pava, “Religious Business Ethics”, 1634. 
38
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Study of Quaker Employers”. 
39
 See Gustafson, “Ethical Holism”, 446–449; similarly McMahon, “Religious Traditions in 
Business Ethics”. 
40
 As, for instance, examined by McMahon “Religious Traditions in Business ethics”; 
Gustafson, “Ethical Holism”; Amitai Etzioni, “Business Schools Deserve an ‘F’ for Teaching 
Business Ethics”, The Washington Post (August 4th, 2002), B4; Stephen J. Conroy and Tisha 
L. Emerson, “Business Ethics and Religion: Religiosity as a Predictor of Ethical Awareness 
among Students”, Journal of Business Ethics 50 (2004), 383–396; Skip Worden, “Religion in 
Strategic Leadership: A Positivistic, Normative/Theological, and Strategic Analysis”, Journal 
of Business Ethics 57 (2005), 221–239; Ruhe and Lee, “International Business Courses”, 383. 
41
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 Ethical capital creation may be conceptually problematic to identify for 
Old Testament stories for a number of different reasons, in particular this is so 
if one draws on the modern market economy system as the comparative 
yardstick. One could argue that problems of ethical capital creation did not 
arise among the societies depicted in the Joseph stories or Solomon stories 
because nearly all economic activities, constrained as they were by the limited 
technology of the time, were environmentally friendly, organic, animal 
friendly, and possibly even used fair trade acceptable production methods. 
These are all issues we associate today with ethical capital creation today.42 
For instance, as depicted in Old Testament stories, animal rearing was 
free-range, and air pollution or soil pollution as it occurred after the industrial 
revolution was basically non-existent. Ethical problems did not occur, at least 
not in the way we nowadays interpret such issues (i.e. as “market 
externalities” which then need to be brought back into an economic calculus, 
through institutional-legal regulation, ethical capital creation, etc.). Hence, 
there was no real identifiable need neither for ethical capital creation nor for 
the legal regulation of environmental pollution or animal rights protection in 
the societies depicted in the Old Testament (although the legal derivatives of 
the Decalogue do, selectively, cover certain animal issues, employment issues, 
etc.).  
Poignantly one could argue that all capital creation and capital 
exchange in the market processes depicted in the Joseph stories and Solomon 
stories “already” reflected ethical capital creation. Nevertheless, for these 
societies and their entrepreneurs the need to market and price ethical capital in 
any kind of significant manner did not exist, because there were no “more 
ethical” alternatives to choose from, and no awareness of more complex 
technologies that could have made more choices possible. This is in stark 
contrast to modern markets where “conventional” production methods differ 
from methods that yield ethical capital. As a consequence, on modern markets 
ethical capital can be “traded” and therefore, on modern markets, we find 
multiple effects of ethical stakeholder economics and the institutional-legal 
regulation of it. The latter are pre-requisites for ethical capital creation. 
 Business ethics teaching can in these respects take the Old Testament 
as an illustration, and even as an utopian inspiration for understanding the 
nature of entrepreneurial activity and the societal organization of markets on 
                                                                                                                           
managers and other stakeholders of the firm (as confirmed by various studies, Ramasamy et 
al., “Role of Religion and Values”; Helmut Schneider, John Krieger and Azra Bayraktar, “The 
Impact of Intrinsic Religiosity on Consumers’ Ethical Beliefs: Does It Depend on the Type of 
Religion? A Comparison of Christian and Moslem Consumers in Germany and Turkey”, 
Journal of Business Ethics (2011), 319-332). However, I question whether business ethics 
courses that aim to raise intrinsic religiosity are highly effective, and this may be even more 
the case for courses at “secular” universities and colleges than for courses at Church-oriented 
or otherwise explicitly religious-oriented educational institutions. 
42
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Moral Agency of the Firm”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Friedman 
Theorem”. 
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which ethical capital is not exchanged and not contested, or at least much less 
so than in many contemporary societies. 
 
 
OLD TESTAMENT ECONOMICS AND TEACHING BUSINESS ETHICS:  
PLURALISM AS AN INTERACTION CONDITION 
 
As an unintentional by-product of the market economy system, pluralism as an 
interaction condition is quasi-automatically tolerated in societies which build 
on the market economy system. The key reason for this is that the organization 
of economic activity is not grounded in personal values per se. Therefore, 
differences in personal value systems of participants in a market economy 
system, i.e. pluralism, do not undermine the functioning of that system.  
On grounds of a fundamentalist moral, fundamentalist religious or 
fundamentalist theological point of view, pluralism may be contested, and may 
even be viewed as ethically undesirable or ethically dangerous. Nevertheless, 
open-minded religious and theological thinkers, and many philosophers who 
somehow connect to the tradition of the Enlightenment would disagree with 
such alarming views, and attest to the ethical nature of the individual’s 
freedom of choice of values, i.e. pluralism. 
 Can we observe pluralism as an “accompanying” feature of the market 
economy systems for the societies depicted in the Old Testament? Again, the 
stories of Joseph and Solomon serve as excellent examples because they rather 
successfully established societies which exhibited features of capitalist 
systems. In the Joseph stories, the two key interacting parties are Egypt and 
Israel. Both nations, with little doubt, cherished rather different value systems, 
the Pharaoh-based religion of Egypt versus Israel’s religious belief system that 
derived its meaning from the patriarchal history. And yet Egypt and Israel not 
only peacefully coexisted in the Joseph stories but also maintained mutually 
beneficial economic relationships. Further pluralistic features of these stories 
are to be seen in the very figure of the Israelite “Joseph” as such: He governed 
Egypt’s bureaucratic hierarchies, and he was married to the daughter of one of 
the high priests of Egypt.  
Similarly, in the Solomon stories, we find pluralistic religious 
dispositions for this society. Solomon was married to many different wives, 
who treasured different religions. Furthermore, he built temples for the 
different gods of his wives, and he even worshipped these different gods. 
More fundamentalist oriented commenters on the Old Testament have 
criticized these outcomes as the “folly of the Solomonic rule”.43 Working from 
a more enlightened perspective, here we can discern pluralistic features in Old 
Testament stories. 
                                               
43
 For example,  Brevard S. Childs, Old Testament Theology in Canonical Context (London: 
SCM Press, 1985), 179–180; Israel Finkelstein and Neil A. Silberman, The Bible Unearthed. 
Archaeology’s New Vision of Ancient Israel and the Origin of its Sacred Texts (London: 
Touchstone, 2002), 163. 
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Counter-examples of Old Testament stories, in which pluralism as an 
interaction feature was lost, are the exodus stories, including the golden calf 
story, and also some of the stories of Joshua’s leadership, in which the 
Israelites began to conquer the land which they considered to be rightfully 
theirs.44 Other tribes and nations were then fought against. This happened also, 
although not exclusively, because of religious fundamentalist issues; for 
instance, in the exodus stories, when the conflict interactions between Egypt 
and Israel began to escalate, the religious representatives of both Egypt and 
Israel became key antagonists. God’s involvement also changed, from the non-
interventionist, tolerant approach in the Joseph stories, to a much more 
antagonizing role, being a key catalyst for the escalation of interaction 
conflicts between Egypt and Israel and the playing out of destructive value 
conflicts.45 A similar comment applies for the war-like interactions among the 
Israelites and the occupants of, and neighbors to, the Promised Land in the 
settlement phase.46 
So, what are the implications for contemporary business ethics 
teaching of having identified pluralism as an interaction condition for various 
Old Testament stories? For a globalizing world in which multinational 
corporations branch out worldwide, in which numerous political economic and 
trade inspired alliances among countries have sprung up on various continents, 
and in which supra-national institutional bodies increasingly organize trade 
and economic politics (WTO, OECD, UN, IMF, Worldbank, etc.), the 
implications of and the necessity for maintaining pluralism as an interaction 
condition are obvious.  
Furthermore, even within societies which we may consider modern in 
one way or another, cultural inhomogeneity, diversity and ethnic mix may be 
the rule rather than the exception. Pluralism is then a necessary interaction 
condition at the societal level and also for smaller units of a society, which 
need to be closely examined should they exhibit diversity in one way or 
another. Old Testament stories serve as useful pedagogic illustrations in this 
respect. 
Business ethics teaching that connects to an economic approach in 
general, and to the kind of economic analysis of the Old Testament which I 
outlined in this paper in particular, here needs to emphasize and inform that 
pluralism, as an essential feature of the “modern” society and international 
community, is uncritical and not problematic for the market economy system. 
Business ethics teaching in this tradition reflects the acceptance and 
endorsement of pluralism; it does not deny values but encourages tolerance 
and diversity of values, whether they differ because of personal, ethnic, 
religious, cultural, national backgrounds or others. If one accepts pluralism as 
                                               
44
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Economic Reading of the Exodus”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, “State 
Formation”. 
45
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “Economic Reading of the Exodus”; Wagner-Tsukamoto, God the 
Economist. 
46
 See Wagner-Tsukamoto, “State Formation”. 
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ethically desirable, then an economic approach to business ethics teaching that 
connects to the market economy and that endorses pluralism exhibits ethical 
qualities. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC OLD TESTAMENT RESEARCH FOR TEACHING 
BUSINESS ETHICS: HOMO ECONOMICUS AND DILEMMATIC INTEREST CONFLICT 
 
In this section, I briefly assess concepts that methodically, heuristically drive 
and undergird institutional and constitutional economics – and business ethics 
theory and practice that draw on these methods. In particular, I look at the 
model of “economic man” (homo economicus) and a dilemmatic model of 
interaction conflict (such as the prisoner’s dilemma concept), which can be 
said to be methodically constitutive for institutional and constitutional 
economic analysis.47 I outline the applicability and fruitfulness of these 
models for business ethics theory and business ethics practice that build on an 
economic approach in general, and on Old Testament economics in particular. 
 
 
OLD TESTAMENT ECONOMICS AND TEACHING BUSINESS ETHICS:  
THE MODEL OF THE HOMO ECONOMICUS 
 
Ideas of self-interest play a key part in economic analysis: The organization of 
economic activity is to materialize mutual gains for interacting agents and for 
society at large, even if merely self-interested agents are encountered. Here, 
one might be tempted to wrongly criticize the homo economicus, as done by a 
considerable number of researchers from the social sciences and arts and 
humanities,48 as an unrealistic, gloomy and even immoral image of human 
nature that supposedly glorifies self-interest (or worse: opportunism, 
predation, and even deceit). 
A number of comments apply. The idea of self-interest, as 
conventionally understood in economics from the works of Smith onwards, 
plays merely a methodical, heuristic role. It is not approached as a feature of 
human nature which is to be behaviorally, empirically inquired about. Smith 
clearly pointed this out49 and many others also stressed this point.50 As a 
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 See Buchanan, Limits of Liberty; Buchanan, “Constitution of Economic Policy”; Karl 
Homann, “Homo Oeconomicus und Dilemmastrukturen”, in Wirtschaftspolitik in offenen 
Volkswirtschaften, ed. H. Sautter (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994), 
387–411; Wagner-Tsukamoto, Human Nature. 
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 For example, Etzioni, Moral Dimension; Pava, “Religious Business Ethics”, 1645–1646; 
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 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 25. See also Sigmund A. Wagner-Tsukamoto, “The Adam Smith-
Problem Revisited: A Methodological Resolution”, Journal des Economistes et des Etudes 
Humaines 19, no. 1 (2013), 63-99. 
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heuristic method, the homo economicus is beyond empirical and moral 
scrutiny, in any behavioral sense of investigating human nature. However, 
theory and practical intervention that is methodically guided by the homo 
economicus is, of course, open to empirical assessments and moral scrutiny. In 
these latter respects, economics has little to fear – as my analysis implied 
above, not only for economic research in general but also for economic 
research that “even” deals with supposedly “religious” text, such as the Old 
Testament (since economics, in this understanding, is empirically and 
normatively focused on mutual advantageous capital exchange; normative 
individualism, respecting the value freedom of the individual; unintentional 
societal benefits as outcome of private economic exchange; locating morality 
in the rules of the game, and in ethical capital creation; etc.).  
 So, for what purpose does economics apply the method “homo 
economicus”, which portrays agents as potentially driven purely by self-
interest and worse? The key purpose is to ensure that economic interactions (a) 
yield benefits for agents and for society at large with regard to mutual gains 
and public good, (b) ensure institutional rule-following by aligning the 
individual’s self-interest with the incentive signals sent out by economic 
institutions (‘rules’ in a broad sense), and (c) encourage ethical capital creation 
(while (d), pluralism is maintained as an uncritical interaction condition). In a 
sense, the homo economicus and a model of self-interest function as a kind of 
crash dummy, helping to make the institutional organization of economic 
activity more resistant (“homo economicus-resistant”) to disastrous effects that 
self-interest can potentially develop in economic exchange if such effects have 
not been regulated for; in the worst, then the outcome can be mutual loss, or 
what game theory terms the classic prisoner’s dilemma predicament.  
The Financial Crisis of 2008 is a classic illustration where self-
interested behaviour and behaviour worse than that collapsed inadequate 
institutional economic governance. As much as one can criticize in this regard 
the more than selfish and even outrightly fraudulent behaviour of the parties 
involved, constitutional and institutional economics in the “classical” tradition 
of Hayek, Friedman, Buchanan, North, Ostrom or Williamson would focus in 
the first place on “economic institutions” as target of investigation, and how 
these did not prepare for effects of self-interested behaviour that could derail a 
mutual gains program. Or, as Smith put this some nearly 250 years ago:  
 
I mean not . . . by any thing which I have here said to throw any 
odious imputation upon the general character of the servants of the 
East India company, and much less upon that of any particular 
                                                                                                                           
Behavior”, Journal of Political Economy 101 (1993), 385–409; Fritz Machlup, Methodology 
of Economics and Other Social Sciences (New York: Academic Press, 1978); Buchanan, 
“Constitution of Economic Policy”; Homann, “Homo Oeconomicus und Dilemmastrukturen”; 
Wagner-Tsukamoto, Human Nature; Paul Heyne, “Are Economists Basically Immoral?” and 
other Essays on Economics, Ethics, and Religion, ed. by G. Brennan and A. M. C. Waterman 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 
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persons. It is the system of government, the situation in which they 
are placed, that I mean to censure, not the character of those who 
have acted in it. They acted as their situation naturally directed, 
and they who have clamoured the loudest against them would, 
probably, not have acted better themselves. . . . Such exclusive 
[monopoly] companies . . . are destructive to those which have the 
misfortune to fall under their government.51  
 
Smith raised a problem of situational governance, of inadequate economic 
institutions, to discuss “odious behaviour” of managers. Rather than blaming 
human nature itself, problems of human nature are projected to situational 
institutional analysis: which reflects the economic approach, conventionally 
understood.52  
Can we then project this line of reasoning to Old Testament 
economics, and then derive principles for the teaching of business ethics? For 
Old Testament economics, I have traced models of self-interest in depth 
elsewhere.53 To briefly recapitulate, models of self-interest are widespread in 
the texts of the Old Testament. Instantly springing to mind are Adam and Eve 
in the very first story, who stole from the divine trees; or Jacob, who rather 
unscrupulously disadvantaged his employer Laban in various ways. For them, 
self-interest showed up in a rather dark way, which modern constitutional and 
institutional economics, in the tradition of Buchanan and Williamson, would 
probably label as predatory behaviour or opportunism.54 For other agents, self-
interest can be observed in a more constructive way: Joseph and Solomon 
enjoyed numerous gains, such as land, villas, chariots, etc., as rewards for their 
skillful institutional ordering.55 
 The teaching of business ethics can in these respects extract models of 
self-interest from the texts of the Old Testament. The purpose would be two-
fold. On the one hand, the methodologically constructive role of applying the 
homo economicus to (institutional) analysis can be pedagogically illustrated: 
Then, the range of ethical principles discussed above in relation to the Old 
Testament text (on mutual gains/public good; constitutional and institutional-
legal ordering; ethical capital creation; and pluralism as an interaction 
condition) can be linked to the instrumentally, methodologically useful role 
the homo economicus plays in realizing these principles in economic terms.  
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 Smith, Wealth of Nations, 641; see also Smith, Wealth of Nations, 638–9, 819; Wagner-
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On the other hand, business ethics teaching that draws on (Old 
Testament) economics needs to highlight that the practical realization of the 
aforementioned ethical principles is conceptually accompanied by another 
heuristic method: by explicit or implicit analysis of (actual or assumed) 
dilemmatic conflict, which may even draw on darker shaded models of self-
interest, such as models of predation or opportunism. This connects my 
assessment of heuristic elements of economic analysis directly to the second 
component that methodically underwires economic analysis (including an 
economic approach to business ethics, and an economic approach to business 




OLD TESTAMENT ECONOMICS AND TEACHING BUSINESS ETHICS:  
A MODEL OF DILEMMATIC INTEREST CONFLICT 
 
A model of self-interest (homo economicus) would not be applied in isolation 
to methodically organize economic analysis. The other element required, and 
possibly even more significant, is the idea of dilemmatic interest conflict. It 
“incorporates” the model of the homo economicus, projecting homo 
economicus behavior in social perspective: Interest conflicts and rationality 
problems are examined in this way for a group – when agents interact as 
homines economici.  
In one way or another, this idea of dilemmatic interest conflicts is 
constitutive not only for institutional and constitutional economics but also for 
most social philosophy, or even theology. The studies of Hobbes are a key 
example: His conceptual construct of the “war of all” illuminates that a group 
or society loses catastrophically if self-interested behavior escalates. In a 
Jewish theological tradition (when examining questions of business ethics), 
Tamari figuratively speaks of the analytical “… problem of controlling desire 
and preventing economic evil” that may lead to “… theft and even 
bloodshed”.56 Modern constitutional and institutional economics here draws 
on the model of the prisoner’s dilemma concept, in which “rationally foolish” 
outcomes result for the group once agents solely follow self-interested choice 
strategies.  
However, one has to stress at this point again, that the “rationally 
foolish” prisoner’s dilemma predicament does not discredit this scenario and 
neither does it the model of economic man.57 An economic approach to 
business ethics stresses in this connection, as for the homo economicus, that 
dilemma analysis plays a heuristic, methodical role. Dilemmatic interest 
conflict is invoked in thought experiments in order to anticipate its socially 
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undesirable effects on group outcomes (mutual gains; public good). Such 
thought experiments are conducted, in many cases, in order to learn how to 
prevent the very empirical occurrence of dilemmatic interest conflict in social 
interactions. Then, institutional intervention is able to contribute, through 
better institutional economic organization that realigns self-interest for mutual 
gains (if desired), to the realization of the various ethical principles discussed 
above. 
 Can we illustrate this heuristic approach of economic dilemma analysis 
for the Old Testament and then project this back to business ethics teaching? 
Possibly the most poignant story of dilemmatic interest conflict, which even 
closely mirrors the prisoner’s dilemma, is the very first story of the Old 
Testament in which social interactions are discussed. In the paradise story, 
institutional structures set economic incentives in a way which, on the grounds 
of prisoner’s dilemma analysis, made theft (“defection”) by Adam and Eve 
nearly a foregone conclusion.58 A similar comment can be applied to the Jacob 
stories (Wagner-Tsukamoto 2009a, 2010, 2013a). Even for the stories in 
which economic cooperation led to great successes (“mutual gains”), i.e. the 
Joseph stories and the Solomon stories, an implicit and resolved dilemma of 
potential interaction conflict can be assumed. From a methodological point of 
view, this is apparent – and in the Old Testament it is also made textually 
“obvious” – by what happened in the immediate aftermath of the Joseph 
stories and Solomon stories: Then, dilemmatic interaction conflict breaks out 
in the exodus stories, and in the stories involving Rehoboam, with the 
prisoner’s dilemma predicament (re-)emerging.59 
 Therefore, the analysis of Old Testament text yields an important 
insight regarding an economic approach to business ethics teaching, namely 
that the methodical, heuristic application of a dilemmatic model of interest 
conflict, as for instance illustrated by the prisoner’s dilemma, somewhat 
ironically actually helps with the very prevention of socially disastrous effects 
of interest conflicts for a group. If not applied, ethically desirable outcomes 
such as mutual gains / public good, the upholding of constitutional and 
institutional-legal ordering, ethical capital creation, and maintaining pluralism 
as an interaction condition can be placed in jeopardy: The Paradise story, the 
Jacob stories, the exodus stories, or the stories involving Rehoboam are 
illustrative. In contrast, the Joseph stories and the Solomon stories imply the 
same by anti-thesis (– and by what happened in the immediate aftermath of 
these stories when interest conflicts escalate and “actual” dilemmas break out; 
in the exodus events, or the events surrounding Rehoboam). 
With regard to the heuristic nature of a model of dilemmatic interest 
conflict and of the homo economicus, the advice for business ethics teaching is 
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largely informative but it turns practically interventionist once heuristic 
analysis is projected to the managerial generation of mutual gains, institutional 






Old Testament economics can ground the teaching of business ethics in a 
number of ways. First, one can project the ethical principles derived from the 
field of Old Testament economics, as they were discussed above, to a religious 
behavioral approach to teaching business ethics. Concepts of public good, 
mutual gains, law-abiding behavior, ethical capital creation, and pluralism are 
in this behavioral tradition approached with divinity in mind. Therefore, the 
teaching of business ethics, in behavioral terms, relates directly to Old 
Testament based religions, whether it is of Jewish, Christian, Islamic or any 
other origin. An academic field of a “religious business ethics” opens up, as 
called for by Herman.60 A “new generation of religious thinkers [about 
business ethics]”61 can here take inspiration from the present paper. Religious 
views of organization members can be merged with economic principles on 
business ethics, as substantiated in this paper through Old Testament 
economics. In this regard, business ethics can build on private, religious 
viewpoints of organization members – as long as this can be negotiated within 
the economic terms delineated. 
As an example, the various ethical principals extracted above can be 
projected to a Jewish business ethics that examines “… the relation between 
law and moral obligation beyond legal requirements”.62 The constitutional and 
institutional economic analysis of rules, and why and how they work to 
constrain economic activity, substantiates – from an institutional and 
constitutional economic perspective – Jewish perceptions about “the law” and 
how this leads to more ethical behavior. Or, concepts of ethical capital 
creation substantiate, again from an institutional and constitutional economic 
perspective, Jewish perceptions about “moral obligations beyond legal 
requirements”, as Herman put it. Also, Jewish positions on the legitimacy of 
wealth and profit-making63 can in this way be further explored with regard to 
Smithsonian economic ideals of public good and the “wealth of nations”. 
 Second, ethical principles of Old Testament economics can be 
approached in more secular, non-metaphysical terms, grounding them in 
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concepts of economic humanism64 or other enlightened moral philosophical 
doctrines. This latter route sidesteps, in the first place, questions of divinity, 
although ultimately it may have to face such questions too (then answering 
either by fully denying the relevance of divinity for business ethics research 
and teaching, or grounding, in meta-theoretical and meta-philosophical terms, 
a debate on business ethics research and teaching in potentially universal, 
generic principles of divinity). 
 To recapitulate, the four ethical principles extracted above from Old 
Testament economics on public good / mutual gains, law-abiding behavior, 
ethical capital creation, and pluralism, are as such neither unavoidably loaded 
with divinity nor is it an “absolute must” to interpret them exclusively in 
secular, non-metaphysical terms. This multiplicity of approaches is not a 
weakness of grounding business ethics teaching in Old Testament economics 
rather it is a strong point: The multiplicity of approaches ensures a generic, 
universal relevance of teaching business ethics with Old Testament texts as an 
outcome. Business ethics teaching in this way provides different frames of 
reference that can accommodate differences in personal, private ethics of 
organization members. Ethics remains a matter of private choice in this 
respect.  
Equally, from an organizational point of view, different types of 
institutions, corporate organizations or non-corporate ones, can tailor Old 
Testament economics as a more divinely inspired approach or as a more 
enlightened, non-metaphysical, secular approach to business ethics pedagogy. 
Macfarlane and Ottewill identified such institutional, context-dependent 
variation of business ethics teaching, with specific reference to Church 
organizations;65 Dorff’s suggestions on how Orthodox Jews and Reform Jews 
approach the Torah can also be projected in this direction as well.66 Alam’s 
discussion is in this respect more one-sided, favoring the normative grounding 
of business ethics in religion, behaviorally understood (e.g. Old Testament 
based religion67). Less extreme is Fort who sides with a moderate approach to 
the religious grounding of business ethics.68 
 The approach to business ethics teaching we ultimately arrive at by 
connecting business ethics pedagogy to Old Testament economics is partial; it 
cannot set out a fully formed program for business ethics. A key reason for 
this is that economics as a scientific discipline “only” selectively applies its 
specific methods and concepts. Critics can here rightly claim that some kind of 
interdisciplinary cooperation with other scientific disciplines, philosophy, 
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and/or theology is essential and should be sought out when setting out 
economic routes to teaching ethics.69 
 A critical question for basically any economic approach to business 
ethics research and teaching is whether the method homo economicus and the 
methodical model of dilemmatic interest conflicts, such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma, subvert the very ethical stature of business ethics research and 
teaching. I argued against this suggestion. Regarding this methodological 
aspect of economic research on ethics, exemplary examples may be found 
among the works of Buchanan, Becker, Homann, or Heyne too, to name a 
few.70 
 Even so, we must critically ask from a fundamental, meta-theoretical 
point of view whether these very economic methods do not empirically 
instigate the kind of behavior they are meant to “remedy.” From “within” 
economics, such criticism can be dismissed, as I outlined. I made the 
figurative comparison to the car crash test scenario and the crash dummy, 
which respectively measure up well to a dilemma scenario and a shortened 
portrayal of human nature. Nevertheless, to further play on the crash test 
analogy, if improved structural features, which make cars safer, entice drivers 
to drive even faster or behave more recklessly, serious questions would have 
to be raised – but would we give up the crash test requirements for car design 
because of these findings, or favor different kinds of intervention to remedy 
this problem, e.g. through the better education of car drivers or different 
institutional intervention with traffic laws and other laws? 
 The parallel conclusion we can draw from an economic approach to 
ethics is similar. Only if it could somehow be ascertained that the undermining 
effects of self-interested choice in economic exchange could be completely 
eliminated from human nature, could a research program on ethics and 
economics be shelved. In this case, however, any kind of somehow 
“economized” religion, theology, or moral philosophy which draws on 
comparable, self-interested or even “darker” images of human nature would 
need to be critically re-examined. 
         The key, open question here is how to (re-)enter a utopian paradise in 
which free will is still a feature of human nature but self-interest cannot derail 
social interactions and no test for self-interest is required (through models of 
the homo economicus and dilemmatic interest conflicts). Old Testament based 
ethics and pedagogy, and business ethics that draw on these, are comparatively 
silent in this respect because of their rather non-utopian but “economized”, 
“down-to-earth” nature, which mirrors concepts and features of the market 
economy so well and takes this system for granted. 
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